Seeing an object on one occasion may facilitate or prime processing of the same object if it is later again encountered. Such priming may also be found -but at a reduced level -for different but perceptually similar objects that are alternative exemplars or 'tokens' of the initially presented object. We explored the neural correlates of this perceptual specificity using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) procedures, contrasting neural activity when participants made object classification decisions (size judgments) regarding previously presented objects (repeated same), alternative exemplars of previously presented objects (repeated different), or entirely new objects (novel). Many frontal regions (including bilateral frontal operculum, bilateral posterior inferior frontal/precentral, left anterior inferior frontal, and superior frontal cortices) and multiple late visual and posterior regions (including middle occipital, fusiform, fusiform-parahippocampal, precuneus, and posterior cingulate, all bilaterally), demonstrated reduced neural activity for repeated compared to novel objects. Greater repetition-induced reductions were observed for same than for different exemplars in several of these regions (bilateral posterior inferior frontal, right precuneus, bilateral middle occipital, bilateral fusiform, bilateral parahippocampal and bilateral superior parietal). Additionally, right fusiform (occipitotemporal) cortex showed significantly less priming for different versus same exemplars than did left fusiform. These findings converge with behavioral evidence from divided visual field studies and with neuropsychological evidence underscoring the key role of right occipitotemporal cortex in processing specific visual form information; possible differences in the representational-functional role of left fusiform are discussed.
Introduction
Human processing of visual forms is characterized by two broadly complementary abilities. On the one hand, we can readily notice what is the same across differing perceptual inputs. Thus, 'a cup, is a cup, is a cup' regardless of whether the object before us is a coffee mug, a tea cup, or a measuring cup. On the other hand, we can also notice (sometimes with surprising acuity) what it is that distinguishes one particular object from others that are, in many respects, very similar. We can differentiate our own cup from someone else's, our own car from among many others, and (if possessed of the appropriate training and interest) a particular type of bird, fish, or plant from among numerous other birds, fish, or plants. The existence of these two, broadly different, forms of perceptual and cognitive processing raises several questions: What cognitive and neural processes support our ability to extract and use comparatively abstract versus highly specific information about visual forms [29, 52, 49] ? Are different regions of the brain responsible for processing specific visual form information as opposed to more abstract types of information [23, 32, 37] ?
